Securing Critical Infrastructure Operations Ch. 01: Overview Report Chapters Securing Critical Infrastructure Operations Report Landing Hub 01 Overview 02 Distributed Operations 03 The Expanding Access Surface 04 Named Threat Patterns 05 Quantum-Ready Access 06 Agent Proliferation 07 From Zero Trust Remote Access to Secure Operations 08 Vertical Outcomes 09 Operator Call to Action 01 CHAPTER 01 2026 Report Overview 2026 Thesis Critical Infrastructure Operations Are Becoming Distributed Application and Data Operations As people, vendors, applications, agents, and workflows connect across OT environments, the network is no longer the right unit of trust. Critical infrastructure operations no longer run behind a single protected perimeter. Industrial sites, building portfolios, data centers, healthcare campuses, utilities, and transportation environments now depend on connected systems, remote teams, third-party vendors, cloud platforms, analytics tools, automation, and operational data flows. That shift creates a new access surface. The exposure is no longer limited to a PLC, controller, workstation, building automation system, or field device. It includes the pathways around operational systems: users, vendors, applications, credentials, service accounts, agents, APIs, remote sessions, cloud integrations, and data workflows. This changes the role of vulnerability management. Operators still need to identify and remediate known flaws in devices, software, and exposed services. But distributed exposure does not come only from vulnerabilities. It also comes from legitimate users, trusted vendors, remote sessions, standing privileges, service accounts, integrations, cloud workflows, and operational data paths that can reach or influence critical systems. In that environment, chasing every vulnerability cannot govern every pathway. ” “The new control point is the operational interaction: who or what is connecting, to which resource, from where, for what purpose, under what policy, with what privilege, and with what visibility.” Named threats make the pattern clear. Campaigns associated with Volt Typhoon / Voltzite, CyberAv3ngers, Sandworm, TRITON / TRISIS, ALPHV / BlackCat, and CL0P show how adversaries exploit credentials, remote access, exposed devices, trusted pathways, legitimate tools, and application/data platforms before they create operational impact. For critical infrastructure operators, the lesson is not to chase every threat name or every vulnerability in isolation. The lesson is to govern the interactions those threats abuse. This report shows how those interactions are expanding, why quantum readiness belongs in long-life access planning, why AI agents and automated workflows will make them harder to govern, and what operators can do to move from broad network entitlement to policy-controlled operational access and increased operational efficiency using modern applications and AI. Methodology and Sources This report draws on public threat advisories, government guidance, standards activity, security research, and public reporting on high-profile incidents affecting critical infrastructure and operationally dependent sectors. We reviewed sources such as CISA, NSA, FBI, NIST, MITRE ATT&CK, major security research teams, and reporting on named threats and real-world disruptions. We also examined patterns seen across Neeve’s work with customers and the broader market as operators adopt remote operations, cloud platforms, analytics, automation, AI agents, service accounts, APIs, and distributed vendor workflows. This report defines a practical lens for critical infrastructure operators: follow the operational interaction. By examining how people, vendors, applications, agents, systems, and data connect, we identify the access patterns that expand exposure and the governance questions operators need to answer as operations become more distributed, automated, and software-mediated. Key Findings Operations are distributed OT now depends on applications, data flows, remote teams, vendors, cloud systems, and automation. Access is the attack surface. Threat actors exploit credentials, remote access, edge devices, legitimate tools, and trusted pathways. Agents expand the actor set. AI agents, service accounts, SaaS automations, APIs, and workflows introduce non-human actors into operational environments. Trust must move to the interaction Security teams need to govern each operational interaction, not simply grant network access.